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Shadow Strategy: The Enduring Challenge of Gray War: Implications for Air and Space Power (DeMarco Banter)



Drafted 4 May 2025

Shadow Strategy: The Enduring Challenge of Gray War: Implications for Air and Space Power

Thankful for National Defense University’s Prism Journal for publishing this article. Here is the original piece prior to edits

The contemporary global security environment is increasingly characterized by competition and conflict that falls short of traditional armed warfare.[1] This phenomenon, often termed gray war or gray-zone conflict, presents a significant and evolving challenge to national security.[2] Actions within this ambiguous realm, situated between routine peace and overt hostilities, are designed to achieve political objectives through coercive methods that remain below the threshold that would typically trigger a conventional military response.[3] Recognizing the growing importance of air and space power in this complex landscape, this analysis explores the core elements, historical evolution, and modern manifestations of gray war, with a particular emphasis on its implications for these critical domains.4[4] By examining scholarly literature, case studies of state and non-state actors, and relevant defense and policy documents, this work aims to provide an updated framework for understanding gray war and offer new insights for the strategic application of air and space power.[5] The findings of this analysis are directly relevant to the Department of the Air Force (DAF), senior leadership within the Department of Defense (DoD), and civilian national security decision-makers, offering actionable recommendations for adapting military strategy, force structure, education, and training to effectively counter gray-zone threats and maintain strategic advantage in the air and space domains.[6]

Understanding the Gray Zone: Definitions, Characteristics, and Evolution

The concept of gray war, or gray-zone conflict, describes the ill-defined area between normal peaceful relations and open warfare.[7] In this space, actors pursue their political aims through methods that stop short of full-scale military engagement.[8] This “limbo land between peace and war” involves aggressive and coercive activities that are carefully calibrated to avoid eliciting a conventional military response.[9] The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines the gray zone as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.”[10] Gray-zone campaigns are “coercive statecraft actions short of war” — integrated efforts that operate above the level of routine diplomacy but remain below the threshold of formal warfare.[11]The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) refers to it as “the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare.”[12] Fundamentally, gray war involves protracted, strategic competition that primarily utilizes non-military or deniable means to undermine adversaries without initiating full-scale combat.[13] A synthesis of various perspectives reveals that gray zone activities typically employ non-traditional statecraft and unconventional methods, remain below the threshold of conventional war, exhibit a level of intensity exceeding steady-state competition, possess ambiguity in intent or attribution, involve some form of coercion or aggression, pursue specific objectives, unfold gradually, and ultimately threaten established international customs, norms, or laws.

Gray war stands apart from traditional warfare, which involves overt armed conflict between regular military forces. It also differs from irregular warfare, such as insurgency or terrorism, and from hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare typically combines conventional and irregular tactics within an ongoing war, as seen in conflicts like Lebanon in 2006 or the Donbas war in 2014.[14] In contrast, gray war is conducted in the space before open war begins, functioning more as a strategic campaign of influence and coercion rather than a direct battlefield engagement. One expert describes gray-zone strategies as having the characteristics of military campaigns in terms of planning and intentionality but primarily employing non-military or non-kinetic tools while staying below critical escalatory thresholds. 

Although hybrid and irregular warfare tactics might be employed within a broader gray-zone campaign, the defining feature of gray war itself is the absence of overt, declared warfare.[15] NATO and many European analysts often refer to “hybrid threats” as encompassing a wide spectrum of sub-threshold activities, this paper adopts a narrower distinction for analytical clarity. Specifically, gray war refers to campaigns of influence and coercion conducted before the outbreak of open conflict, while hybrid war denotes the blending of conventional and irregular tactics once warfare is underway.  Though NATO sometimes uses “hybrid” to describe activities within the gray zone, distinguishing these concepts enables more precise strategic analysis and response planning. 

A NATO analysis points out that hybrid warfare is marked by the blurring of the lines between war and peace, creating an environment where conflict occurs “below the threshold of war.“[16] Gray war strategically exploits this ambiguity, deliberately operating in the gray area where war is “elusive” and difficult to definitively identify.5 In essence, gray war involves “warfare” conducted without a formal declaration of war, achieving political, economic, or territorial effects through incremental and deniable actions rather than through direct military battles.5

While often associated with non-state insurgents in Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), the modern gray zone reflects a shift—where state actors, particularly revisionist powers, reclaim the initiative through covert means. Bill Lind and others defined 4GW as the erosion of the state’s monopoly on violence. Yet gray war reverses this erosion by allowing states to manipulate ambiguity, use proxies, and weaponize influence without accountability. 

Whereas 4GW emphasized the erosion of state authority, particularly through non-state insurgents and ideological warfare, gray war suggests a strategic evolution—states have adapted by reclaiming influence through plausible deniability, subversion, and digital narrative control. This may reflect a Fifth-Generation adaptation, or a reconsolidation of statecraft under new forms. While the concept of Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW) remains contested and loosely defined—often associated with cognitive manipulation, narrative dominance, and individualized targeting—it signals a strategic shift in how power is projected without kinetic force. In this context, gray war may represent the operational manifestation of 5GW principles at the level of statecraft. As Robert Leonhard noted in his early work on 5GW, ‘The target of warfare will be the population’s will, perception, and understanding’ rather than physical forces alone—a description that aligns closely with the indirect, deniable, and influence-driven strategies seen in contemporary gray war.[17]  This evolution fills critical gaps in 4GW theory and demands a reexamination of how state power operates through unconventional, deniable channels.[18]

Some scholars have challenged the utility of terms like “gray zone” and “hybrid war,” arguing that such concepts blur traditional distinctions between war and peace and complicate the development of coherent strategy. However, this analysis maintains a clear conceptual distinction: gray war refers to pre-war, sub-threshold coercion and influence campaigns, while hybrid war describes the blending of conventional and irregular tactics within declared conflicts. By preserving this definitional clarity, gray war remains a valuable framework for understanding contemporary strategic competition and guiding effective responses.[19]

Several core elements characterize gray-zone conflict. Ambiguity and deniability are central, with aggressors often masking their involvement or using proxies to ensure their actions cannot be easily attributed. This deliberate ambiguity complicates legal responses and obscures international perception. Russia’s deployment of unmarked “little green men” troops in Crimea in 2014 serves as a clear example, allowing Russia to seize territory while officially denying any involvement.[20] Gradualism and threshold manipulation are also key features. Gray-zone campaigns typically progress incrementally, employing a “salami-slicing” approach to remain below the thresholds that would trigger a significant military response.[21] Rather than a sudden, overt invasion, these campaigns involve a series of minor moves, each seemingly insignificant on its own but cumulatively strategic. Gray war inherently involves multi-domain operations, with actors leveraging a combination of diplomatic, informational, military (often covert or paramilitary), economic, and legal instruments in a synchronized manner.[22] Cyber operations, space activities, clandestine military actions, economic coercion, and propaganda are all coordinated to achieve synergistic effects.4 Lawfare and exploitation of legal gray areas are frequently employed, with aggressors often weaponizing legal systems and exploiting gaps in international law.[23]This might involve twisting legal arguments or using domestic law to justify aggressive actions, knowing that democracies constrained by law may hesitate to respond in kind. Economic and technological levers are also staples of gray war. Economic coercion, through sanctions, trade embargoes, or debt traps, and tech-driven tactics, such as cyberattacks, surveillance, and social media manipulation, can be used to “thwart, destabilize, weaken, or attack an adversary” without resorting to conventional military force.[24] Perhaps the defining characteristic of gray conflict is the battle for influence through influence operations and information warfare.[25] Disinformation campaigns, political influence operations, support for extremist groups, and propaganda aim to erode an opponent’s society from within.[26]By exploiting societal divisions, spreading false information, interfering in elections, or using “illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive” information operations, gray-zone actors seek to achieve objectives traditionally associated with military force, but without firing a shot.[27]

Major defense and policy institutions have significantly contributed to the understanding of gray war. The U.S. Department of Defense recognizes the gray zone as the arena of “competition, coercion, and compellence” that exists below the threshold of armed conflict.[28] The 2015 USSOCOM white paper formally introduced the term “gray zone” into common usage.[29] The RAND Corporation highlights that gray-zone strategies are particularly attractive to “revisionist” powers seeking to alter the status quo but wishing to avoid the risks of major war.[30] RAND studies emphasize the coherent and intentional nature of modern gray campaigns, characterizing them as carefully orchestrated efforts akin to war plans but utilizing primarily non-military means.[31] NATO and European analysts often discuss gray-zone threats under the umbrella term “hybrid warfare.“[32] NATO has cautioned that adversaries employ hybrid tactics “to exploit the ‘gray zone’ between war and peace” and that the Alliance must be prepared for “actions below the threshold of armed conflict” that present dilemmas for collective defense.[33] A NATO Review article observed that while hybrid warfare is not entirely new, its contemporary form, especially following Russia’s 2014 operations in Ukraine, involves a combination of deniable special forces, local armed actors, economic leverage, disinformation, and the exploitation of socio-political polarization to achieve objectives without conventional war.[34] Think tanks such as CSIS have established “Gray Zone Project” initiatives,[35] noting that this phenomenon is also referred to as “sharp power, political warfare, malign influence,” and other related terms.[36] Even UNESCO’s work on peace and education intersects with the challenges of the gray zone, emphasizing the need for futures literacy and resilience in societies facing novel forms of conflict, and stressing the importance of anticipating complexity and “embracing new possibilities for action” in the face of ambiguous threats.[37]

The essence of gray war, though the term itself is modern, reflects enduring principles of strategy. Sun Tzu’s timeless maxim that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”[38] perfectly encapsulates the core objective of gray war. Sun Tzu advocated for achieving victory through deception, indirect maneuvers, and by targeting the enemy’s strategy and alliances — all of which are central to gray-zone operations.[39] Indeed, contemporary Chinese military doctrine, such as the “Three Warfares”(2003) strategy encompassing psychological, media, and legal warfare, directly echoes Sun Tzu’s emphasis on indirect approaches.[40]

Thucydides, in his account of the Peloponnesian War, documented how great powers like Athens exerted pressure on weaker states through ultimatums rather than outright military assault.[41] Rather than open coercion, contemporary gray war echoes the subtler strategies of the Cold War—George Kennan’s concept of “political warfare” or Soviet use of active measures. Unlike the stark ultimatum of the Melian Dialogue, gray zone actors leverage uncertainty, ambiguity, and indirect influence to create conditions where adversaries cannot clearly identify either threat or response, thus complicating retaliation or deterrence. Carl von Clausewitz famously stated that war is “the continuation of policy by other means.“ Clausewitz’s concept of friction and the fog of 

 war is also highly relevant, as gray-zone campaigns thrive in the ambiguity they create.[42] Niccolò Machiavelli’s counsel on statecraft, emphasizing the use of cunning, guile, and pragmatism, resonates strongly within the context of the gray zone.[43] As Machiavelli observed, “A wise prince must learn how not to be good.”[44] Gray war requires states to operate in ways that democratic traditions may find uncomfortable—indirect, coercive, and plausibly deniable.

Comparative Analysis: Conventional War, Irregular War, Hybrid War, and Gray War

 The chart below provides a comparative analysis of conventional war, irregular war, hybrid war, and gray war. It clarifies distinctions in terms of actors, use of force, legal status, duration, goals, key tactics, and notable examples, addressing critiques that these terms are often conflated.

CharacteristicConventional WarIrregular WarHybrid WarGray War (Gray-Zone Conflict)
Actors InvolvedState vs. state, regular military forcesState vs. non-state (e.g., insurgents, terrorists); State vs. state possible, often via insurgency tacticsState vs. state, often via proxies or covert unitsBoth state and non-state actors; state coordination and intent dominate
Use of ForceOvert, large-scale military operationsAsymmetric tactics, guerrilla warfare, sabotageMix of conventional and irregular (e.g., militia + tanks), possibly cyber and info opsCovert, deniable, and non-kinetic (cyber, info ops, economic); limited or indirect force
Legal StatusDeclared war, governed by international law (e.g., Geneva Conventions)Often outside formal war declarations or legal clarityOccurs within declared or undeclared conflict; mixes legal and illegal actorsBelow threshold of war; ambiguous legal standing; deniability central
DurationShort to medium duration; decisive battlesOften protracted, long-term struggleCan be prolonged; tied to active conflict or regional tensionsLong-term, incremental campaigns with unclear thresholds or end states
GoalsDefeat enemy militarily, seize territory or political controlUndermine or delegitimize state authority; gain local legitimacyMilitary victory through blended methods; strategic disruptionChange the status quo without triggering overt war or collective defense mechanisms
Key TacticsDirect combat, set-piece battlesInsurgency, terrorism, propaganda, ambushesConventional + irregular forces, cyber, disinformation, proxiesInfluence ops, lawfare, cyber, economic coercion, strategic ambiguity, deniable proxies
Notable ExamplesWWII, Gulf WarVietnam War, Taliban insurgency, Algerian WarUkraine (Donbas 2014), Lebanon (2006 Hezbollah)Crimea (2014), South China Sea, election interference, cyber sabotage

NOTE: While real-world conflicts often blur these categories, the distinctions outlined here are designed to clarify operational implications for air and space doctrine.

The Modern Manifestations of Gray War: Case Studies

While the term “gray zone” gained prominence relatively recently, the tactics associated with it have historical precedents.[45] During the Cold War, the Soviet Union engaged in actions that shared many similarities with contemporary Russian strategy.[46] George Kennan, in his influential 1948 memorandum, described Russia’s approach as “political warfare,” defining it as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.“[47] This included overt measures as well as covert operations designed to influence policy.[48]Throughout the Cold War, the West also engaged in what could be considered gray zone activities, with the entire period representing a 45-year-long struggle in this domain.[49] Tactics such as subversion, the use of unmarked military forces, and foreign interference to influence policy have long been employed by various state actors. The support provided by the United States to the government of El Salvador during the insurgency from 1980 to 1991, involving a small advisory force, represents another historical example of a long-duration, low-visibility operation that aligns with the characteristics of gray zone conflict.[50] Similarly, France’s support to revolutionary forces in the American Revolution[51] and Germany’s actions during the Sudetenland Crisis[52] can be viewed through the lens of gray zone tactics, with revisionist powers seeking to alter the existing order without triggering a full-scale war with the status quo powers.[53] These historical examples underscore that while the terminology may be new, the underlying strategic logic and many of the tactics employed in the gray zone have deep roots in the history of statecraft.[54]

The 21st century has witnessed a significant increase in the use of gray zone strategies by various state and non-state actors.[55] Russia’s actions in Ukraine, particularly the 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent involvement in eastern Ukraine, are widely considered a classic example of gray zone warfare.[56] In Crimea, Russia employed a combination of tactics, including the deployment of unmarked special forces operatives known as “little green men” to seize key infrastructure and government buildings.[57] This was accompanied by a massive disinformation campaign aimed at sowing confusion and shaping public opinion both within Ukraine and internationally.[58] Russia also exploited local pro-Russian sentiment and orchestrated a swift referendum to legitimize the annexation.[59] This multi-faceted approach allowed Russia to effectively gain control of Crimea while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding direct military confrontation with Ukraine or its Western allies. Russia’s continued actions in eastern Ukraine have involved similar tactics, including the use of proxy forces, cyberattacks, and sustained information operations.[60]

China’s activities in the South China Sea represent another prominent example of a state-sponsored gray zone campaign. China has engaged in extensive artificial island building on reefs and shoals in the contested waters, gradually militarizing these features while claiming they are for civilian purposes. A key tactic has been the use of its maritime militia, composed of civilian vessels controlled by fishermen, to assert control over disputed waters, harass vessels from other nations, and even take territory using what is known as the “cabbage strategy” — surrounding contested areas with numerous vessels. Economic coercion has also been employed to pressure other claimant states in the region. These actions have allowed China to incrementally alter the status quo in the South China Sea without triggering a direct military response from other nations.[61]

Iran has also actively utilized gray zone tactics3 to expand its influence in the Middle East. A key element of its strategy is the support and direction of various non-state actors, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, to project power and influence regional conflicts. Iran has also conducted numerous cyberattacks against regional rivals and Western interests, often operating through loosely affiliated hacker groups. Additionally, Iran employs front companies and informal financial networks to circumvent sanctions and maintain economic influence. These tactics have enabled Iran to extend its reach and challenge regional rivals without engaging in direct military confrontation.[62]

North Korea’s long-term pursuit of nuclear weapons can be viewed as a protracted gray zone operation. The regime has incrementally advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities, often using provocations followed by negotiations to extract concessions. Information manipulation and strategic ambiguity about its capabilities have been used to create uncertainty and leverage in diplomatic negotiations. North Korea has also engaged in cyberattacks and cryptocurrency theft to circumvent sanctions and fund its weapons programs.[63]

Beyond state actors, non-state actors are also increasingly employing gray zone tactics. Groups like Hezbollah have been identified as models for how non-state actors can exploit Western weaknesses.[64] The Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 demonstrated a significant evolution in non-state actor capabilities, showcasing coordinated air operations using paragliders, commercial drones, and homemade rockets, challenging the traditional dominance of nation-states in the air domain.[65] Transnational criminal organizations are also utilizing commercial-grade drones for scouting smuggling routes, harassing officials, transporting illicit cargo, and intimidating civilians.[66] The Jalisco New Generation Cartel in Mexico has even reportedly hired Middle Eastern terrorists as technical advisors and is fielding an elite drone unit trained to modify and fly commercial drones as attack aircraft.[67]

The increased reliance on gray zone strategies can be attributed to several factors. Primarily, it allows actors to achieve strategic objectives while avoiding the high costs and risks associated with conventional warfare. In an era where large-scale aggression can lead to devastating consequences, including potential nuclear escalation, states are seeking alternative ways to exert influence and achieve their goals. The increasing economic and social interdependence of the world also makes large-scale conflict less appealing. Furthermore, revisionist powers, those seeking to alter the existing international order, find gray zone tactics attractive as they can be employed incrementally, below the threshold that might provoke a decisive response from status quo powers like the United States. Technological advancements, particularly in cyber and information domains, have provided new tools and avenues for conducting gray zone operations with greater deniability and impact. The ambiguity inherent in international law and the challenges of attribution in cyberspace also create opportunities for gray zone actors to operate with relative impunity. The perceived advantages of achieving strategic gains without triggering a major military response make gray zone strategies an increasingly attractive option for a growing number of state and non-state actors.[68]

Implications for Air Power in the Gray Zone

Air power plays a multifaceted role in the context of gray zone conflict, offering both crucial capabilities and facing significant challenges.[69] Air assets, both manned and unmanned, provide essential Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for monitoring the ambiguous activities that characterize the gray zone.[70] While modern overhead systems possess remarkable multispectral capabilities to gather vast amounts of data, their ability to interpret the human dimension — emotions, attitudes, and motivations — which is often critical in irregular conflict, remains limited.[71] Nevertheless, the persistent stare and wide reach of air power enable the monitoring of borders, contested territories, and potential adversary movements, providing critical information for situational awareness. Furthermore, air power can be employed in influence operations through the dissemination of information, psychological operations, and projecting a visible presence without resorting to kinetic force, signaling commitment and resolve.[72]The increasing use of drones by state actors like Russia, China, and Iran in gray zone activities further underscores the relevance of air power in this domain.[73]

Recent deployments of U.S. strategic bombers—including B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s—to Europe and Diego Garcia exemplify the role of air power in gray zone operations. These visible and deliberate movements project force, reassure allies, and deter adversaries, all without crossing the threshold into armed conflict.[74] Air power, in this context, supports psychological signaling and strategic messaging, functioning as a form of deterrence by presence.[75] Moreover, the increasing use of drones by state actors like Russia, China, and Iran in gray zone activities—ranging from surveillance to harassment and coercion—further underscores the relevance and adaptability of air assets in this contested space.[76]

However, the proliferation of air capabilities to non-state actors presents a significant challenge to traditional air power dominance. The emergence of “guerrilla” air forces, as exemplified by groups like the Tamil Tigers, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, al-Shabaab, transnational criminal organizations, and most recently Hamas, demonstrates that the asymmetric advantage traditionally held by nation-states in the air domain is eroding. These actors are increasingly utilizing inexpensive and readily available commercial drones for reconnaissance, surveillance, propaganda, and even attacks, as tragically demonstrated by the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023. This necessitates a re-evaluation of air defense strategies and a broader understanding of the potential aerial threats that can originate from non-state actors.26

Traditional air power strategies and doctrines, largely developed for conventional warfare scenarios, may prove inadequate for effectively addressing the complexities of the gray zone.[77] These doctrines often emphasize decisive, rapid effects achieved through overwhelming firepower, which may not be suitable or even counterproductive in the nuanced and ambiguous environment of gray war.[78] The focus on high-end military equipment, such as advanced fighter jets and bombers, while crucial for maintaining conventional deterrence, might need to be balanced with investments in capabilities specifically tailored for gray zone operations, including enhanced ISR, cyber warfare capabilities, and effective countermeasures against the growing drone threat from both state and non-state actors. Operating in the gray zone often requires strategic patience and a recognition that gains are likely to be incremental and achieved over extended timeframes, a departure from the more immediate objectives of conventional air campaigns.[79]The inherent ambiguity of gray zone activities demands a more adaptable and flexible air power doctrine capable of responding to a wide spectrum of threats below the threshold of traditional armed conflict.[80] The reluctance of Western nations to engage in “all-out” war has created space for adversaries who view conflict as a continuum, operating in the gray areas to achieve their objectives. Therefore, a reorientation in the application of air power in these situations, supported by targeted capability enhancements, is essential.[81]

Implications for Space Power in the Gray Zone

The space domain presents a unique set of challenges and opportunities within the context of gray zone conflict.[82] Space assets are strategically vital for communications, navigation, surveillance, and intelligence, all of which are critical enablers for both conducting and countering gray zone activities.[83] However, these assets are also inherently vulnerable to non-kinetic attacks that fall within the gray zone, such as cyber operations, jamming, and spoofing.[84] The very nature of space, with its reliance on electromagnetic signals and orbital mechanics, makes it a domain where disruption and degradation can be achieved without the overt violence of traditional warfare, aligning perfectly with the principles of gray war.[85]

Cyber operations represent a significant gray zone threat to space power.29 Adversaries can target both the satellite systems themselves and their ground control infrastructure to disrupt or deny their functionality.[86] Jamming, which involves interfering with the uplink or downlink signals of a satellite, is another frequently employed tactic to prevent communication or the transmission of critical data.[87] Spoofing, as demonstrated by the Russian manipulation of U.S. GPS signals in 2017, can provide false information, leading to navigation errors or the compromise of systems relying on accurate positioning data.[88] These non-kinetic methods allow actors to degrade or disrupt adversary space capabilities without creating the debris associated with kinetic attacks, a particularly concerning issue given the potential for Kessler Syndrome, a cascading effect of collisions that could render certain orbital regions unusable for decades.[89]

Maintaining robust Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is paramount in the gray zone. The ability to continuously monitor and track objects and activities in space is essential for detecting and attributing gray zone attacks. This includes identifying unusual orbital maneuvers, detecting cyber intrusions, and recognizing jamming or spoofing attempts.[90]Furthermore, developing resilient space architectures is crucial for ensuring that space-based capabilities can withstand and recover from gray zone attacks. This might involve redundant systems, the ability to rapidly reconstitute lost capabilities, and enhanced cybersecurity measures. [91]

A significant challenge in the space domain is the blurring line between civilian and military activities. Adversaries might intentionally mask military objectives behind seemingly benign commercial space programs, creating ambiguity and making it difficult to discern hostile intent.[92] For example, a commercial satellite with dual-use capabilities could potentially conduct reconnaissance or even interfere with another nation’s satellite under the guise of routine operations. This ambiguity complicates the development of appropriate responses and underscores the need for enhanced transparency and international norms of behavior in space. The increasing congestion of space due to the proliferation of commercial satellites further exacerbates this challenge, making it harder to distinguish between accidents, malfunctions, and deliberate attacks.[93] The lack of clearly defined international laws and enforcement mechanisms in space also contributes to this permissive environment for gray zone activities.19 Unlike terrestrial domains with established borders and airspace regulations, space enjoys freedom of navigation, making it difficult to enforce restrictions or establish no-fly zones.[94]

Strategic and Operational Recommendations for the DAF and DoD 

Effectively countering the challenges posed by gray war and maintaining strategic advantage in the air and space domains requires more than conceptual alignment—it demands concrete organizational adaptation, purpose-built units, and doctrinal clarity. This section outlines a cohesive framework for gray-zone deterrence and response, rooted in operational reforms across force design, doctrine, capability development, legal posture, and strategic influence. Anchored in the principles of persistent engagement, multi-domain integration, and comprehensive resilience, these recommendations offer actionable pathways for shifting from reactive responses to proactive shaping of the gray zone battlespace.

Persistent Engagement: Signal Strength Without Escalation:  Effective deterrence in the gray zone begins with continuous ISR operations empowered by machine learning and behavioral analytics.[95] Persistent overhead presence enables early detection of sub-threshold actions and serves as a visible signal of commitment. Forward-positioned unmanned air assets in contested regions can help deter adversary coercion through presence operations without crossing kinetic thresholds.

Multi-Domain Integration: Break Down Silos to Preempt Threats:  Responding to ambiguous threats demands real-time integration of air, space, cyber, information, and special operations. Developing a unified command-and-control framework that synchronizes these domains is essential. Particular emphasis should be placed on non-kinetic effects—cyber and electromagnetic operations—to deny, deceive, or disrupt adversary actions before escalation occurs.[96]

Comprehensive Resilience: Harden Infrastructure, Accelerate Recovery: The U.S. must prepare for gray-zone attacks on its space-based and digital infrastructure. Investing in distributed satellite constellations, agile launch capabilities, and redundant systems will reduce vulnerabilities. At the same time, AI-powered cyber threat detection should be integrated across all DAF networks. [97] Legal resilience is equally important: DoD must establish clear preemptive legal authorities to respond to lawfare and ambiguity exploitation.[98]

Influence and Counter-Influence Operations: Own the Narrative Battlespace:  Winning in the gray zone often hinges on influence, not force. The DAF must embed narrative warfare specialists within Air and Space Operations Centers to craft and disseminate strategic messaging in sync with ISR feeds and open-source intelligence. These specialists would enable rapid counter-disinformation and preemptive influence shaping. Strategic communication must be treated as an operational domain.[99]

Capability and Force Structure: Build Task Forces for the Gray Zone: Standard force packages are often ill-suited for gray zone missions. The DAF should create cross-functional Gray Zone Task Forces at the AOR level, modeled after successful joint interagency teams. These units would integrate cyber operators, ISR analysts, legal experts, and influence specialists—designed for attribution, counter-messaging, and escalation control in ambiguous environments.[100]

Legal and International Frameworks: Set the Rules Before Others Do:  The absence of clear international norms in the gray zone—especially in cyber and space—creates dangerous ambiguity. The U.S. must lead efforts to establish legal frameworks through alliances like NATO and Five Eyes, prioritizing common attribution standards, joint doctrine, and proportional response thresholds. Domestically, updating legal authorities for gray-zone action is imperative.[101]

Finally, Strategic Education and Training: Develop Ambiguity-Proficient Leaders:  Gray zone conflict demands leaders who can think asymmetrically and act decisively without clear rules of engagement. PME curricula should include gray-zone scenarios, red team analysis, and strategic wargaming that expose officers to disorienting dilemmas and narrative-based threats. Simulation and tabletop exercises must evolve to reflect the complexity of contested information and cyber environments.[102]

Military strategy must evolve to fully integrate air, space, cyber, and information operations into a cohesive multi-domain framework specifically designed to address gray zone threats.[103] This necessitates the development of specialized units and training programs focused on the unique aspects of identifying, countering, and attributing gray zone activities within the air and space domains. Enhancing intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities is also crucial for gaining a deeper understanding of adversary intentions, tactics, and vulnerabilities in this ambiguous environment. Incorporating realistic gray zone scenarios into military exercises and simulations will further improve the preparedness of personnel to operate effectively in this complex landscape.[104]

Seamless multi-domain integration and robust collaboration with allies and partners are essential for a successful counter-gray zone strategy.[105] Close coordination between the Air Force, Space Force, Army, Navy, and other relevant government agencies is paramount. Strengthening existing alliances and forging new partnerships will enhance the collective ability to address gray zone threats, share critical intelligence, and develop best practices for response.[106]

Emerging technologies and innovative operational concepts hold significant potential for enhancing our ability to counter gray zone threats. Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics can be leveraged to detect subtle patterns and anomalies that may indicate gray zone activities in both the air and space domains.[107] The development and deployment of non-kinetic counterspace capabilities are crucial for deterring and responding to gray zone attacks against our space assets without escalating to kinetic conflict.[108] Furthermore, the strategic use of information operations and strategic communication can effectively expose and counter adversary disinformation campaigns, undermining their influence and credibility.[109]

Specifically for the DAF, a dedicated strategy for air power in the gray zone should be developed. This strategy should emphasize ISR capabilities tailored for ambiguous environments, the effective use of non-kinetic effects, and robust measures to counter the increasing air threats posed by non-state actors, particularly the proliferation of drones.[110] Investing in technologies and training to enhance the detection and interception of small, low-signature aerial threats is a critical priority.[111] Strengthening the cyber defenses of Air Force networks and weapon systems against both state-sponsored and non-state actor cyberattacks is equally important.[112]

The DoD should establish a clear framework and criteria for when and how the military should engage in gray zone activities, ensuring that such actions are closely aligned with and supportive of broader diplomatic efforts.[113] The development of a comprehensive national counter-gray zone strategy, coordinated at the White House or National Security Council level, is essential for ensuring a unified and effective whole-of-government response. Working collaboratively with Congress to update existing laws and regulations to better address the unique challenges posed by gray zone activities, particularly in the rapidly evolving domains of cyberspace and space, is also crucial.[114] Finally, enhancing efforts to build resilience in critical infrastructure22 against the full spectrum of gray zone attacks is a vital step in safeguarding national security.[115]

To prevail in gray war, the Department of the Air Force and the broader DoD must think like a strategist, act like a technologist, and move like a network. The battle for influence, legitimacy, and perception will be won not with firepower alone but through proactive presence, information agility, and resilient integration across all domains. These recommendations are not just responses to today’s challenges—they are a blueprint for strategic advantage in the wars that will never be declared.

Potential Future Scenario: South China Sea, 2028.

To illustrate how these proposed capabilities and frameworks might operate in practice, consider the following future scenario:

As tensions rise over disputed islands, China’s maritime militia swarms an allied nation’s resource exploration vessels under the cover of heavy electronic jamming. Simultaneously, GPS signals in the region are spoofed, and disinformation campaigns flood social media with false narratives about U.S. intentions.

A joint U.S. Air Force and Space Force gray-zone response unit is activated. High-altitude ISR drones, operating under AI-assisted command-and-control frameworks, quickly detect the buildup. Distributed space assets re-route around jamming zones, ensuring persistent surveillance. Cyber teams disrupt command links to hostile drones, while allied information operations teams launch rapid counter-narratives across key platforms. A show of force by unmanned aerial systems in “visible presence” mode helps de-escalate without firing a shot.

Drawing from Schelling’s logic of coercion, the use of ISR platforms in “visible presence” mode functions as deterrence by detection—signaling both capability and intent to escalate if necessary. Meanwhile, cyber disruption of adversary networks represents compellence through denial—removing the ability to continue coercive behavior without initiating open conflict. [116]

No shots are exchanged, but China’s effort to change the status quo is effectively countered.

Conclusion: Maintaining Strategic Advantage in the Era of Gray War

Gray war represents a persistent and growing challenge to national security, characterized by its ambiguous nature and the deliberate use of actions below the threshold of traditional armed conflict.[117] Air and space power play increasingly vital roles in this complex security environment, both as potential targets of gray zone tactics and as critical enablers for intelligence gathering, influence operations, and defensive countermeasures.[118] The strategic recommendations outlined in this analysis underscore the importance of adapting military strategy, force structure, education, and training to effectively address these evolving threats.[119] Multi-domain integration, strong collaboration with allies and partners, and the innovative application of emerging technologies are essential for maintaining strategic advantage.[120] The Department of the Air Force and the Department of Defense must prioritize the development of dedicated strategies, enhanced capabilities, and clear frameworks for operating in the gray zone.[121] Continuous adaptation, innovation, and robust collaboration across government agencies and with international partners will be paramount in safeguarding national security and maintaining strategic advantage in the 21st century.[122]

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[1] Ryan Burkholder, “Tackling Russian Gray Zone Approaches in Post–Cold War Era,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies 14, no. 2 (2023): 151–173, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS_Fall%202023_14_2_Burkholder.pdf.

[2] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/.

[3] RAND Corporation, “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA594-1.html.

[4]  Lukas Milevski, “When Does Gray Zone Confrontation End? A Conceptual Analysis,” Joint Force Quarterly 112 (2024): 4–10, accessed March 14, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-112/jfq-112.pdf.

[5] Mike Carey; and Charlie McGillis, “Navigating the Gray Zone: Reframing Space Strategy for Contemporary Operational Environments,” Air University Press, 2023, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3821280/navigating-the-gray-zone-reframing-space-strategy-for-contemporary-operational/.

[6] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[7] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/.

[8] Ryan Burkholder, “Tackling Russian Gray Zone Approaches in Post–Cold War Era,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies 14, no. 2 (2023): 151–173.

[9] United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Gray Zone, White Paper, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/ussocom-gray-zones/.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[13] RAND Corporation, “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA594-1.html.

[14] NATO Review, “Hybrid Warfare: New Threats, Complexity, and ‘Grey Zone’ Conflicts,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.

[15] RAND Corporation, “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA594-1.html.

[16] NATO Review, “Hybrid Warfare: New Threats, Complexity, and ‘Grey Zone’ Conflicts,” accessed March 14, 2025,  https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.

[17] Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998), 216.

[18] Lind, William S., and Gregory A. Thiele. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House, 2015.​

 

[19] Stoker, Donald and Whiteside, Craig (2020) “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two, Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 4.

Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4

[20] United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Gray Zone, White Paper, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/ussocom-gray-zones/.

[21] RAND Corporation, “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA594-1.html.

[22] Royal Air Force, “Evaluate the Potential Effectiveness of Air Power in Sub-threshold and ‘Grey Zone’ Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/aspr/aspr-vol25-iss1-6-pdf/.

[23] Asmeret Naugle and Michael Bernard, “Proxy War in the Gray Zone,” OSTI, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1456327.

[24] RAND Corporation, “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA594-1.html

[25] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018). https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1045785.pdf.

[29] United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Gray Zone, White Paper, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/ussocom-gray-zones/.

[30] RAND Corporation, “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA594-1.html.

[31] Ibid.

[32] NATO Review, “Hybrid Warfare: New Threats, Complexity, and ‘Grey Zone’ Conflicts,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[36] Ibid.

[37] UNESCO, Futures Literacy: A Capability for People and Communities, Paris: UNESCO, 2019, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000372349.

[38] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

[39] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66–77.

[40] Dean Cheng, “Winning without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2692 (May 21, 2012), accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-without-fighting-chinese-legal-warfare.

[41] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Modern Library, 1982), 400–408.

[42] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87, 119–121.

[43] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 61–70.

[44] Ibid, 61

[45] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/

[46] United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Gray Zone, White Paper, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/ussocom-gray-zones/.

[47] George F. Kennan, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, April 30, 1948, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dreams-of-freedom/pdf/kennan-memo.pdf.

[48] Ibid. 

[49] Nora Bensahel, “Darker Shades of Gray: Why Gray Zone Conflicts Will Become More Frequent and Complex,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/02/darker-shades-gray-gray-zone-conflicts-will-become-frequent-complex/ .

[50] United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Gray Zone, White Paper, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/ussocom-gray-zones/.

[51] Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 22-38

[52] Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 258–274.

[53] Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 22–36; and Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 258–274.

[54] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Modern Library, 1982), 400–408.

[55] Nora Bensahel, “Darker Shades of Gray: Why Gray Zone Conflicts Will Become More Frequent and Complex,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/02/darker-shades-gray-gray-zone-conflicts-will-become-frequent-complex/ .

[56] United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Gray Zone, White Paper, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/ussocom-gray-zones/.

[57] Ibid. 

[58] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[59] United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Gray Zone, White Paper, 2015. https://publicintelligence.net/ussocom-gray-zones/.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Peter Layton, “China’s Gray Zone Air Power,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chinas-gray-zone-air-power/.

[62] Ryan Burkholder, “Tackling Russian Gray Zone Approaches in Post–Cold War Era,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies 14, no. 2 (2023): 151–173, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS_Fall%202023_14_2_Burkholder.pdf.

[63] RAND Corporation. North Korean Sanctions Evasion Techniques. Accessed March 21, 2025. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1500/RRA1537-1/RAND_RRA1537-1.pdf

[64] Ryan Burkholder, “Tackling Russian Gray Zone Approaches in Post–Cold War Era,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies 14, no. 2 (2023): 151–173, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS_Fall%202023_14_2_Burkholder.pdf.

 

[65] Ibid. 

[66] David Carment and Dani Belo, “Gray-Zone Conflict Management: Theory, Evidence, and Challenges,” Journal of European, Middle Eastern, and African Affairs (June 2020), accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JEMEAA/Display/Article/2213954/gray-zone-conflict-management-theory-evidence-and-challenges/.

[67] Ibid. 

[68] Nora Bensahel, “Darker Shades of Gray: Why Gray Zone Conflicts Will Become More Frequent and Complex,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/02/darker-shades-gray-gray-zone-conflicts-will-become-frequent-complex/ .

[69] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/.

[70] Royal Air Force, “Evaluate the Potential Effectiveness of Air Power in Sub-threshold and ‘Grey Zone’ Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/aspr/aspr-vol25-iss1-6-pdf/.

[71] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 16, 2023, accessed March 21, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/.

[72] Lyle J. Morris et al., Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), accessed March 22, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2942.htm

[73] Peter Layton, “China’s Gray Zone Air Power,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chinas-gray-zone-air-power/.

[74] U.S. Air Forces Europe – Air Forces Africa Public Affairs, “U.S. Strategic Bombers Deploy to Europe for Bomber Task Force Mission,” USAFE-AFAFRICA News, February 2024, accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3657211/us-strategic-bombers-deploy-to-europe-for-bomber-task-force-mission/.

[75] Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Campaigns and Operations, 18 June 2022, III-8 to III-9.

[76] Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “Drones in Gray Zone Warfare: Implications for International Security,” RUSI Commentary, November 2023, accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/drones-gray-zone-warfare-implications-international-security.

[77] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/.

[78] Royal Air Force, “Evaluate the Potential Effectiveness of Air Power in Sub-threshold and ‘Grey Zone’ Operations,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/aspr/aspr-vol25-iss1-6-pdf/.

[79] Peter Layton, “China’s Gray Zone Air Power,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chinas-gray-zone-air-power/.

[80] Nora Bensahel, “Darker Shades of Gray: Why Gray Zone Conflicts Will Become More Frequent and Complex,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/02/darker-shades-gray-gray-zone-conflicts-will-become-frequent-complex/ .

[81] Maj David Stuckenberg and Lt Col Peter Garretson“ Updating the Laws of War for the 21st Century: Time to Reconsider, and Ban, Modern Nation-Killing Aircraft,” Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2021/02/a2dd91_138568c360744a94b28f3ceff0d2e1f0.pdf.

[82] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/.

[83] Alan T. Dugger, “Space as a Gray Zone: The Future of Orbital Warfare,” Modern War Institute, accessed March 14, 2025 https://mwi.westpoint.edu/space-as-a-gray-zone-the-future-of-orbital-warfare/ .

[84] David Carment and Dani Belo, “Gray-Zone Conflict Management: Theory, Evidence, and Challenges,” Journal of European, Middle Eastern, and African Affairs (June 2020), accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JEMEAA/Display/Article/2213954/gray-zone-conflict-management-theory-evidence-and-challenges/.

[85] Richard D. Newton, “Air and Space Power in the Gray Zone,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, accessed March 14, 2025, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/air-and-space-power-in-the-gray-zone/

[86] David Carment and Dani Belo, “Gray-Zone Conflict Management: Theory, Evidence, and Challenges,” Journal of European, Middle Eastern, and African Affairs (June 2020), accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JEMEAA/Display/Article/2213954/gray-zone-conflict-management-theory-evidence-and-challenges/.

[87] Alan T. Dugger, “Space as a Gray Zone: The Future of Orbital Warfare,” Modern War Institute, accessed March 14, 2025 https://mwi.westpoint.edu/space-as-a-gray-zone-the-future-of-orbital-warfare/ .

[88] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[89] Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais, “Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt,” Journal of Geophysical Research: Space Physics 83, no. A6 (1978): 2637–2646.

[90] U.S. Department of Defense, 2020 Defense Space Strategy Summary, accessed March 14, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020-DEFENSE-SPACE-STRATEGY-SUMMARY.PDF.

[91] Alan T. Dugger, “Space as a Gray Zone: The Future of Orbital Warfare,” Modern War Institute, accessed March 14, 2025 https://mwi.westpoint.edu/space-as-a-gray-zone-the-future-of-orbital-warfare/ .

[92] The Strategist, “The Commercial Advantage in Space’s Grey Zone,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-commercial-advantage-in-spaces-grey-zone/.

[93] Alan T. Dugger, “Space as a Gray Zone: The Future of Orbital Warfare,” Modern War Institute, accessed March 14, 2025 https://mwi.westpoint.edu/space-as-a-gray-zone-the-future-of-orbital-warfare/ .

[94] Ibid. 

[95] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[96] Jim Mitre  and  Andre Gellerman, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), “Defining DoD’s Role in Gray Zone Competition,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/defining-dods-role-in-gray-zone-competition . 

[97] U.S. Department of Defense, 2020 Defense Space Strategy Summary, accessed March 14, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020-DEFENSE-SPACE-STRATEGY-SUMMARY.PDF.

[98] Dean Cheng, “Winning without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2692 (May 21, 2012), accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-without-fighting-chinese-legal-warfare.

[99] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion

[100] Maj David Stuckenberg and Lt Col Peter Garretson“ Updating the Laws of War for the 21st Century: Time to Reconsider, and Ban, Modern Nation-Killing Aircraft,” Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2021/02/a2dd91_138568c360744a94b28f3ceff0d2e1f0.pdf.

[101] ClearanceJobs, “Gray Zone Warfare: How Counterintelligence Must Adapt to Modern Threats,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://news.clearancejobs.com/2024/08/21/gray-zone-warfare-how-counterintelligence-must-adapt-to-modern-threats/

[102] UNESCO, Futures Literacy: A Capability for People and Communities (Paris: UNESCO, 2019), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000372349.

[103] U.S. Department of Defense, 2020 Defense Space Strategy Summary, accessed March 14, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020-DEFENSE-SPACE-STRATEGY-SUMMARY.PDF.

[104] UNESCO, Futures Literacy: A Capability for People and Communities (Paris: UNESCO, 2019), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000372349.

[105] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion.

[106] Dean Cheng, “Winning without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2692 (May 21, 2012), accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-without-fighting-chinese-legal-warfare.

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