The Art of Disengagement: DeMarco Banter

There is a time to fight and a time to stop fighting. Leadership depends on knowing the difference.

Organizations celebrate persistence. Stay in the fight, never quit, hold the line. Leaders are expected to persevere, overcome obstacles, and refuse to surrender. Sometimes that is exactly what leadership requires.

But persistence can harden into stubbornness, and commitment into attachment. The determination to make something work can blind leaders to the possibility that the conditions have fundamentally changed.

Leaders confuse the mission with the position, the purpose with the organization, the idea with the structure built around it. The most dangerous confusion treats disengagement as defeat.

The Trap of What Gets Built

People attach to what they create: organizations, programs, teams, ideas, relationships. Years of energy and creativity go into building something that matters.

Then circumstances shift. Leadership turns over, priorities move, resources dry up, and the organization heads in another direction. The instinct is to defend the creation, and often that instinct is sound.

The harder question is whether continuing to fight for the structure still serves the purpose that inspired it. That question has a different answer more often than builders like to admit.

Decades of research explain why. Barry Staw (1976) found that people who had chosen a course of action committed more resources to it after negative feedback than people who inherited the same decision. Arkes and Blumer (1985) documented the sunk-cost effect, and Joel Brockner (1992) organized the causes of escalating commitment into project, psychological, social, and structural determinants. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) showed that owners value an object more than identical objects they do not own, which makes builders the least objective judges of what they have built. Donald Sull (1999) found the organizational version in what he called active inertia: when conditions shift, firms accelerate the patterns that once made them successful. Staw and Ross (1987) recommended setting exit criteria in advance and bringing fresh judgment to the decision to continue.

Adaptation Applies to the Adapter

Innovation changes what an organization has. Strategic adaptability changes what it does and, when necessary, what it believes.

The concept is easy to admire in military organizations, emerging technologies, and historical campaigns. It gets harder when the thing that must adapt is the leader. Most people consider themselves adaptable until adaptation requires giving up something they value. A title, a role, a project, an organization they helped create. At that point the theory taught in the classroom becomes a reality to be lived.

The distinction has deep roots. Argyris and Schön (1978) separated single-loop learning, which corrects actions within existing assumptions, from double-loop learning, which questions the assumptions themselves. John Boyd (1976) argued in “Destruction and Creation” that keeping pace with a changing environment requires breaking apart mental concepts that no longer fit and building new ones. Ronald Heifetz (1994) drew the leadership implication: adaptive challenges cannot be solved with existing expertise, and they require people to give up habits, loyalties, and sometimes identities. Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh (1988) described role exit as a sequence running from first doubts through a turning point to the creation of an ex-role, and Herminia Ibarra (2003) found that professional identity shifts as people try provisional new roles. Letting go is a process with stages, and leaders who expect it to be a single decision tend to stall in the middle.

The Illusion of Control

Napoleon could issue orders at Borodino, but that didn’t mean he controlled the battle.

Leaders today face a similar problem. They can influence people, shape conditions, build relationships, and make decisions, but they cannot control every outcome. The more complex the system, the less likely it is that authority alone will produce the results sought. Sometimes the most important leadership decision is recognizing that the ability to influence a situation has changed.

Kutuzov understood this. After Borodino, with his army battered but intact, he gave up Moscow rather than stake that army on defending the city. Many of his officers were appalled. The position was lost, and the instrument of the purpose survived. Napoleon occupied an abandoned city, waited for a surrender that never came, and began a retreat that destroyed his army.

Clausewitz supplied the vocabulary. In Book Seven of On War, the culminating point of victory marks the moment when an attacker’s advantage begins to decline and pressing further invites reversal. In Book Six, he analyzed retreat into the interior as a defender’s option, trading space for time while the attacker’s strength wears down. Both ideas drew on 1812, a campaign in which Clausewitz served with the Russian army.

There is a difference between abandoning a mission and abandoning a method that no longer works.

Repositioning

History is full of people and ideas that survived because someone understood when to step away. The work continued from a new position.

Ideas migrate, relationships endure, and people carry forward what they have learned. Organizations may disappear while the capabilities they created survive.

Sociology has a term for the mechanism. Verta Taylor (1989), studying the American women’s movement through the lean decades between waves of activism, described abeyance structures: small, committed networks that hold ideas, identities, and tactics through unfavorable periods and hand them to the next cohort. Albert Hirschman (1970) supplied the broader frame in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, which treats leaving, pressing for repair, and staying loyal as the basic responses to decline. Exit is a legitimate choice in that frame. It gains force when voice has stopped producing change.

Often the most important thing to preserve is the capacity to begin again, more than any particular program or structure. That takes patience, restraint, and a willingness to let others lead, even when they would do things differently. For people accustomed to taking charge, that may be the hardest form of leadership.

A Test for Restraint

The strategist is usually imagined as someone who sees opportunities others miss, challenges conventional wisdom, and acts decisively. Timing matters as much as vision. Not every battle deserves to be fought, and not every position deserves to be defended.

Sometimes the smartest move is to conserve energy, observe the system, maintain relationships, and wait for conditions to change. Done well, that is disciplined restraint. It is also a convenient excuse, so it needs a test.

Disengagement serves a larger purpose only if it passes three checks. Would the decision look the same if staying were comfortable? Does the exit keep the purpose alive through other hands, channels, or forms? Can the door stay open for a return? A no to the first question means discomfort is doing the deciding.

The checks borrow from two literatures. Staw and Ross (1987) urged exit criteria set before a commitment goes bad, which keeps the decision from being made in the emotional heat of failure. Rita McGrath (1999) developed real options reasoning, which treats small, reversible commitments as a way to keep the future open. A disengagement that preserves options belongs to a different category than an abandonment.

Purpose and Position

The hardest lesson may be this one. People describe themselves through what they do: titles, organizations, accomplishments, the things they have built. Those things matter, but they are vehicles for purpose.

A teacher doesn’t stop being a teacher when the classroom changes. A leader doesn’t stop being a leader when the title disappears. A strategist doesn’t stop thinking strategically when someone else makes the decisions. Purpose outlasts the structures that express it, and the greatest test of strategic adaptability comes when those structures change.

Disengagement takes courage, and it works best when it is chosen and temporary, long enough to remember what the fight is for. Sometimes the most strategic thing a leader can do is stop fighting for the position and start protecting the purpose.

Further Reading

Argyris, Chris, and Donald Schön. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. Addison-Wesley, 1978.

Arkes, Hal R., and Catherine Blumer. “The Psychology of Sunk Cost.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35, no. 1 (1985): 124-140.

Boyd, John R. “Destruction and Creation.” 1976.

Brockner, Joel. “The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical Progress.”Academy of Management Review 17, no. 1 (1992): 39-61.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, 1976.

Ebaugh, Helen Rose Fuchs. Becoming an Ex: The Process of Role Exit. University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Heifetz, Ronald A. Leadership Without Easy Answers. Harvard University Press, 1994.

Hirschman, Albert O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press, 1970.

Ibarra, Herminia. Working Identity: Unconventional Strategies for Reinventing Your Career. Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 6 (1990): 1325-1348.

McGrath, Rita Gunther. “Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and Entrepreneurial Failure.” Academy of Management Review 24, no. 1 (1999): 13-30.

Staw, Barry M. “Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action.”Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 16, no. 1 (1976): 27-44.

Staw, Barry M., and Jerry Ross. “Knowing When to Pull the Plug.” Harvard Business Review 65, no. 2 (1987): 68-74.

Sull, Donald N. “Why Good Companies Go Bad.” Harvard Business Review 77, no. 4 (1999): 42-52.

Taylor, Verta. “Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance.” American Sociological Review 54, no. 5 (1989): 761-775.

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